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INFLUENCE OF THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE SELECTION OF ITEMS FOR AN 
ATTITUDE SCALE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study
The general purpose of the study was to describe trends 
in the selection of items for the construction of an atti­
tude scale to be presented to the general public. The major 
hypotheses were designed to investigate the effects of a 
subject's attitude toward an issue in the selection of state­
ments to be used in the assessment of attitudes of the general 
public toward that same issue. The issue chosen for the 
present study was capital punishment.
A modification of procedures of attitude assessment 
devised by Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965), Sherif and 
Hovland (1953), and Thurstone (1928) was used in the present 
study to assess attitudes of subjects toward the issue of 
capital punishment. Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) have 
defined attitude scales in terms of latitudes of acceptance, 
noncommitment and rejection and most acceptable and most 
objectionable positions. An extension of their procedures
-I-
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wam umed in the present study to inyestisste fineness of dis­
crimination between items that are placed within latitudes 
of acceptance, noncommitment and rejection. Of major interest 
was the influence of discrimination on the selection of state­
ments from the latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment and re­
jection for the purpose of constructing an attitude scale to 
be presented to the general public. The question of fineness 
of discrimination between statements becomes important when 
one considers the possibility of biasing factors in the con­
struction of attitude scales. Statements may be subject to 
differential wording or placement along an attitude scale as 
a result of discriminability of the person constructing the 
scale. The focus of the present study was on differential 
selection of statements from latitudes of acceptance or re­
jection due to the influence of discrimination between state­
ments.
A second purpose of the present study was to leam if 
subjects select a greater proportion of acceptable or ob­
jectionable statements to be included in a scale to measure 
attitudes of the general public. Studies (Hovland & Sherif, 
1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953; Whittaker, 1963; La Fave &
Sherif, 1968) have demonstrated that judges' attitudes do 
influence categorization of statements about controversial 
issues.
A third major area of interest in the present study was
-3-
r#lat#d to finding# by Hart (1967) concerning aubjacts who 
adopt a modorat# position on an iaauo. Hart (1967) found 
difforoncoa in tha aiza of latitudes of rejection of soft and 
hard moderates, and the present study is partially concerned 
with verification of these findings.
£eed tor thm gtudy
A major factor in the development of effective means of 
attitude assessment is the elimination or reduction of bias 
on the part of the person constructing the scale. Thurstone 
(1929, 1931) and others (Hinckley, 1932; Ferguson, 1935; 
Pintner & Forlano, 1937) considered this factor and assumed 
that the scale values of statements derived by the method of 
equal-appearing intervals were independent of the attitudes 
of judges who rated the statements. Subsequent research 
(Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953; Kelley, Hov­
land, Schwartz & Abelson, 1955) suggested that judges' atti­
tudes do influence the derivation of scale values. Such bias 
limits the extent to which any attitude scale is truly repre­
sentative of the entire range of possible statements about 
the issue in question. Recognition of these biasing factors 
force the expansion of attitude scales to include statements 
representative of the sample of people whose attitudes are 
being measured, rather than being representative of the person 
vdio is measuring the attitude. An analysis of variables which 
might influence the selection and wording of statements for
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mttitud# meal## ahould provlda Information loading to a re­
duction of biaa aa a function of the attitude of the peraon 
conatructing the acale. If atatementa preaented to aubjeeta 
are not repreaentative of the range of attitudea in the aub- 
ject population, then the acale may be limited in ita ef- 
fectiveneaa.
More apecifically, biaa may reault from the tendency 
for judgea to make finer diacriminationa between acceptable 
atatementa than between objectionable atatementa. Studiea 
(Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953) have ahown 
the tendency for high involved aubjeeta to accept a amall 
number of atatementa and reject a large number of atatementa, 
Thia tendency waa . , deacribed aa a raiaed threahold of 
acceptance and a lowered threahold of rejection on the part 
of highly ego-involved individuala" (Sherif & Hovland, 1961, 
p. 105). These authora interpreted the findings aa an in­
dication that the subject is more discriminating about 
statements he accepts than about statements he rejects. The 
present study waa designed to leam if discrimination would 
reault in a greater range of acale values of atatementa se­
lected from the latitude of rejection than from the latitude 
of acceptance. Such a study is necessary to leam if biaa 
may be introduced into an attitude acale aa a reault of dif­
ferential discrimination between acceptable and objectionable 
atatementa,
•»5»
Theoretical Background
Evidence from studiea of perception and Judgment support 
the idea that categorization is one of the fundamental proc­
esses of perception and cognition (Bruner, 1957). Judgment 
or categorization of stimuli results in placement along a 
range or continuum of similar stimuli. When a single stimu­
lus is •' . . . Judged against the background or functionally 
related stimuli, this background for Judgment can be called 
the individual's reference scale for the special item in 
question" (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 50). Placement of atti- 
tudinally related items into categories presupposes the for­
mation of a reference scale for a particular class of stimuli. 
Reference scales are formed as a consequence of repeated en­
counters with given stimuli, and once such scales are formed, 
future Judgment of similar stimuli is relative to these scales 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961).
Reference scales contain outstanding reference points 
(anchorages) which influence Judgment (Sherif & Sherif, 1956). 
Psychophysical experiments with physical stimuli (weights, 
lights, tones) have demonstrated shifts in Judgment toward 
or away from anchor points. Of particular relevance to 
Judgmental shifts are assimilation and contrast effects which 
occur as a function of distance between object or Judgment 
and anchor. An assimilation effect is " . . .  a shift in 
placement of a stimulus toward an anchor value . . .", a 
contrast effect is a shift " . . .  in placement of a stimulus
—6 —
away from an anchor value . . . "  (Sherif & Hovland, 1961, 
p. 40).
From information derived from psychophysical and per­
ceptual studies of assimilation and contrast effects comes 
evidence that psychological reference scales, or psychosocial 
scales are formed in the same way as psychophysical scales 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1936; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif,
Sherif & Nebergall, 1963; Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Once 
psychological reference scales are established, they serve 
a function similar to physical scales, i.e., provide a basis 
for comparison of relevant stimulus items. In categorizing 
social stimuli, however, the individual's attitudes and ego 
become involved in the judgment of stimuli. "When the indi­
vidual has a definite attitude about a class of objects, he 
brings to any specific situation involving it a set of cate­
gories already established . . . "  (Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 
1963, p. 9).
In attempting to define an attitude. Allport (1933) dis­
cussed the variety of definitions of attitude, and pointed out 
common points of agreement between the various definitions. 
Attitudes involve a specific orientation toward stimulus ob­
jects, and vary in intensity (Young, 1931; Bernard, 1930). 
Allport (1933) summarized by saying that " . . .  the essential 
feature of attitude is a preparation or readiness for response" 
(p, 8). Additional criteria of attitudes offered by Sherif
-7-
«nd Sherif (1956, 1969) and Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall 
(1965) emphaiize the learned nature of attitudes, and the mo­
tivational and emotional characteristics. The bipolar nature 
of attitudes has been emphasized by many writers (Bogardus, 
1931; Thurstone, 1931; Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965), and 
may be summed up in Allport's (1935) statement:
An attitude characteristically provokes behavior 
that is • • . favorable or unfavorable, affirmative 
or negative toward the object . . . with which it is 
related. This double polarity in the direction of 
attitudes is often regarded as their most distinctive 
feature (p. 8).
Scott (1968) discusses properties of attitudes such as 
salience, overtness, flexibility and consciousness. Salience 
and overtness refer to the amount of expression of an atti­
tude, flexibility to the " . . .  ease with which an attitude 
may be modified . . . "  (p. 207). Consciousness refers to the 
ready availability of the attitude to the "conscious mind" of 
the individual. Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) emphasize 
that attitudes must be inferred from consistencies in individual 
behavior toward specific stimuli. This characteristic of at­
titudes has led to the development of numerous techniques to 
measure attitudes. Before proceeding to a discussion of at­
tempts to measure attitudes, a summary definition of the term 
attitude is offered from Sherif and Sherif (1969):
An attitude is the individual's set of categories 
for evaluating a domain of social stimuli (objects, 
persons, values, groups, ideas, etc.) idiich he has 
established as he leams about this domain (in 
interaction with other persons, as a general rule) 
and which relate him to subsets within the domain
"»8—
with varying degree# of positive or negative effect 
(motivation-emotion) (pp. 336-337).
The first major attempts to measure attitudes occurred dur­
ing the 1920s. Bogardus (1924-1925) devised a Social Distance 
Scale to evaluate attitudes toward various national or ethnic 
groups. A second major attempt in attitude measurement came 
from Thurstone (1928, 1929) and Thurstone and Chave (1929). 
These authors devised a single scale for attitudes which con­
sisted of a number of statements ranging from extremely fa­
vorable to extremely unfavorable toward a specific issue.
Each statement was assigned a scale value vdiich was derived 
by the method of equal-appearing intervals. Thurstone em­
ployed psychophysical techniques in the construction of atti­
tude scales in order to obtain an objective, quantifiable 
measure of an individual's attitude (Thurstone, 1931). Such 
a technique would serve to eliminate bias based on judges' at­
titudes, a factor %diich Thurstone and Chave (1929) considered 
in the following quote:
If the scale is to be regarded as valid, the scale 
values of the statements should not be affected by 
the opinions of the people \dio help to construct it 
(P. 92).
The method of equal appearing intervals utilized in the con­
struction of the scale assured that it would be " . . . more 
than a description of the people who construct the scale" 
(Thurstone & Chave, 1929, p. 92).
Hinckley (1932) tested this assumption by using con-
-9-
trastlng groups of pro-Negro and anti-Negro white judges and 
Negro judges to categorize 114 statements about the social po­
sition of the Negro. The judges derived scale values on the 
issue by the method of equal-appearing intervals. Since the 
scale values for the three groups were highly correlated (r 
ranged from .93 to .98) Hinckley concluded that the scale was 
independent of the attitudes of the judges and the equal-ap­
pearing intervals procedure was effective in eliminating bias 
from construction of the scale. Some subsequent research 
(Ferguson, 1935; Pintner & Forlano, 1937) supported this con­
clusion.
Hovland & Sherif (1952) contested this assumption by 
duplicating the Hinckley study. They used the same 114 state­
ments on the social position of the Negro, as well as con­
trasting subject groups of pro-Negro and anti-Negro white 
judges and Negro judges. However, these authors questioned 
Thurstone's procedure of discarding judges who placed more 
than 30 percent of the statements in a single category. Hov­
land and Sherif (1952) concluded that the greater the involve­
ment of the judge (subject) the greater the number of statements 
placed in a single category and the fewer categories used.
When subjects were given a choice as to the number of catego­
ries needed, the more involved subjects used fewer categories 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1953). Such findings led Hovland and 
Sherif (1952) to suggest the possibility of measuring attitudes 
by means of an indirect approach idiich relied " . . .  entirely
-10-
on the way (the subject) distributes his Judgments" (p.831).
In addition, this indirect method of measuring attitudes
would allow the subject to establish his "own categories",
or use as many or as few categories as needed.
. . .  the extension or constriction of the scale he 
establishes, the number of categories he uses, . . . 
the direction of concentration of items may all pro­
vide useful indices for analysis of the way the in­
dividual 'perceives* the issue (Hovland & Sherif,
1952, p. 831).
Subsequent research with the "own categories" procedure 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1953; La Fave & Sherif, 1968; C. W.
Sherif, 1961, 1963; Vaughan, 1961) led Sherif, Sherif and 
Nebergall (1965) to define attitude scales (judgmental cate­
gories) in terms of latitudes or acceptance, noncommitment 
and rejection:
Latitude of acceptance is the position on an issue 
(or toward an object) that is most acceptable, 
plus other acceptable positions.
Latitude of rejection is the most objectionable 
position on the same issue plus other objection­
able positions.
Latitude of noncommitment (consists of) . . . 
those positions not categorized as either accept­
able or objectionable in some degree (p. 24).
Sherif and Hovland (1961) maintain that the judgmental 
processed involved in reactions to social stimuli can be ex­
plained in terms of assimilation-contrast effects. Judgment 
of stimuli on a given psychosocial scale is relative to the 
individual's degree of ego-involvement in an issue. Indi­
viduals with a great deal of ego-involvement with a given 
social issue demonstrate a raised threshold of acceptance and 
lowered threshold of rejection, which results in a constriction
-11-
of the range of assimilation and expansion of the range of re­
jection (contrast effect) (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, 
Sherif & Nebergall, 1965). Stionili falling into the latitude 
of rejection are judged as more discrepant, and are subject to 
derogation or unfavorable reaction from the individual.
Less commitment to a stand on a given issue results in a 
greater range of assimilation or expansion of the latitude of 
acceptance to include neutral statements on the issue (assim­
ilation effect). Studies of attitudes on political and other 
controversial issues show that the more extreme the stand, the 
greater the rejection of opposing or even neutral stands on the 
same issue (Whittaker, 1963; La Fave & Sherif, 1968; Sherif, 
Sherif & Nebergall, 1965).
Research on categorization of statements about controver­
sial issues demonstrated that persons holding extreme stands 
tend to distribute judgment bimodally about the extremes of the 
scale (Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953; Hovland, 
Harvey & Sherif, 1957; La Fave & Sherif, 1968; Sherif & Hovland, 
1961). Differences between own stand and opposite stand are 
emphasized, and intermediate items are displaced toward the 
ends of the scale. Therefore, strong commitment on a controver­
sial issue tends to result in a large latitude of rejection rel­
ative to the latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment (Sherif 
& Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & 
Sherif, 1969).
-12-
In contrast to parsons holding extreme stands on an is­
sue, those with moderate stands tended to exhibit greater 
variability and equality of distribution of statements along 
an attitude scale (Vaughan, 1961). Regardless of extremity 
of stand however, " . . .  the strongly worded, unequivocal 
statements of extreme positions . . . "  (Sherif, Sherif & 
Nebergall, 1965, p. 139) were accurately and consistently 
placed in extreme categories by both moderate and extreme 
judges, thus reflecting the ability of persons to consistent­
ly categorize clear-cut statements on an issue. Therefore, in 
placing verbal items along a scale of a social issue, indi­
viduals are capable of discriminating among statements repre­
senting different positions of different social groups. In­
dividuals can order these statements along a continuum of 
favorableness-unfavorableness, particularly if the statements 
are not ambiguous. If the individual has a strong involvement 
in the issue, this influences his placement of the item or 
statement along a continuum. Using his own stand as an anchor 
in the judgment of social stimuli, the highly involved indi­
vidual tends to place items on the acceptable side or on the 
objectionable side of the scale, leaving very few items in the 
middle range. Conversely, individuals Wio are moderately in­
volved in the issue tend to distribute items more evenly along 
the scale, placing a greater number of items in the middle range 
or in the latitude of noncommitment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; 
Vaughan, 1961; Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif &
Sherif, 1969). However, Diab (1965) and Hart (1967) report
-13-
evidence that highly involved moderates tend to reject a great­
er number of statements than they accept, which suggests that 
persons highly committed to a moderate or middle of the road 
position may react in the same way as persons committed to ex­
treme positions. These findings were further investigated in 
the present study. Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) report 
that the size of the latitude of rejection or number of state­
ments rejected is the best single indicator of degree of in­
volvement in an issue. " . . .  the number of positions reject­
ed proved to be the most discriminating index of relative ego 
involvement or commitment" (p. 156). The present study investi­
gated the tendency of persons adopting moderate positions on a 
scale to place greater or fewer numbers of statements into the 
latitude of rejection in relation to the degree of "moderateness* 
displayed. Hart (1967) made a distinction between two types of 
subjects idio chose a moderate position as their most acceptable 
position. He defined moderate as: " . . . not one of the two 
most extreme categories on each end of the scale, or the odddle 
or 'neutral* position . . (pp. 15-16).
Hart's (1967) distinction was between hard moderates and
soft moderates. Hard moderates were defined as:
Subjects that chose a category (in relation to their 
most acceptable position) toward the extreme end of 
the scale representing their side of the issue as ^ e  
category within their latitude of acceptance that is 
next in acceptableness to their most acceptable posi­
tion . . .  (p. 22).
Soft moderates were defined as:
-14-
Subjects that chose a category (in relation to their 
most acceptable category) toward the extreme end of 
the scale representing the side of the issue opposite 
their own stand . • . (p. 22).
For purposes of the present study, a different procedure 
was devised for distinguishing between hard and soft moderates.
The attitude scale on the issue of capital punishment de­
vised by Peterson (1931) was chosen as the instrument for at­
titude assessment for the present study. Each statement in 
the scale has a scale value derived by the method of equal-ap­
pearing intervals. Peterson and Thurstone (1933) utilized the 
capital punishment scale to assess attitude change in students 
after exposure to a motion picture " . . .  judged as having af­
fective value on the issue in question . . . "  (p. xv).
Hart's (1967) distinction between hard and soft moderates 
was based on the relationship between the subject's most accept­
able position, next most acceptable position and latitude of re­
jection. Hard moderates were those subjects whose latitude of 
acceptance extended in the direction opposite the latitude of 
rejection. Soft moderates were those subjects whose latitude of 
acceptance extended in the direction toward the latitude of re­
jection.
A similar distinction was made in the present study. Mod­
erates were those subjects Wio did not choose as most acceptable 
the two statements at either extreme of the Peterson capital 
punishment scale, i.e., who did not choose as most acceptable the
—15—
statements with scale values of 0,0, 0.1, or 10.4, 11.0 (See 
Appendix A). In addition, subjects were not classified as 
moderate if they chose as most acceptable the middle of the 
road statement, "It doesn't make any difference to me whether 
we have capital punishment or not" (scale value 5.5).
In the present study, the distinction between hard and 
soft moderates was based on the relationship between the sub­
ject's most acceptable position, and the mean Peterson scale 
value for the latitude of acceptance, and the latitude of re­
jection. Hard moderates in the present study, were those sub­
jects whose mean Peterson scale value (in relation to their 
most acceptable position) for the latitude of acceptance ex­
tended toward the end of the scale representing their side of 
the issue, i.e., the latitude of acceptance extended in the 
direction opposite the latitude of rejection. In the present 
study, soft moderates were those subjects whose mean Peterson 
scale value (in relation to their most acceptable position) for 
the latitude of acceptance extended toward the extreme end of 
the scale representing the side of the issue opposite their own 
stand, i.e., whose latitude of acceptance extended in the direc­
tion toward the latitude of rejection.
Since the distinction between hard and soft moderates in 
the present study was similar to the distinction made by Hart 
(1967), both procedures should identify the same subsets of 
subjects. In both cases, the soft moderates should accept 
statements vdiich lie in the direction of the latitude of re­
-16-
jection, and hard moderates should accept statements which lie 
in the direction opposite the latitude of rejection.
In spite of criticisms by Sherif and Hovland of the Thur­
stone approach to attitude scaling, there is evidence to sup­
port the stability of Thurstone*s scales over considerable 
periods of time. Hinckley (1963) reports his follow-up study 
of attitudes toward social position of the Negro. In this 
study, he found a correlation of .94 between scale values de­
rived by contrasting groups of pro-Negro and anti-Negro sub­
jects. Hinckley found a comparable correlation of .98 in his 
study in 1932 in which he used pro and anti-Negro white subjects 
to derive scale values for the attitude scale on the social posi* 
tion of the Negro.
Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) agree that the tech­
nique of attitude scaling devised by Thurstone (1928) does per­
mit " . . .  the ordering of at least certain items in a given 
universe of discourse . . .  as a baseline for comparison . . 
and that the " . . .  methods developed for scaling attitudinal 
items will continue to be useful for this purpose" (p. 245).
York (1966) utilized Thurstone's method of equal-appearing 
intervals to derive scale values for the issue of capital pun­
ishment to determine the stability of Thurstone scale values 
over several years. He found a correlation of .98 between the 
scale values obtained in 1930 by Peterson (1931) and the scale 
values obtained in 1966.
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Osgood, Sud and Tannanbaum (1957), in evaluating the use­
fulness of the Semantic Differential as a measure of attitudes, 
report significant correlations between the evaluative dimen­
sion of the Semantic Differential and Thurstone's scales of at­
titudes toward the Church, the Negro and Capital Punishment. As 
a measuring instrument, the evaluative dimension of the Semantic 
Differential consists of a number of bipolar adjective scales 
ranging in value from -3 (unfavorable adjectives, e.g., bad, 
unfair, etc.) through 0 (neutral) to +3 (favorable adjectives, 
e.g., good, fair, etc.). The attitude score of a concept such 
as Negro is obtained by a summation of all evaluative ratings 
(Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). The three concepts. Church, 
the Negro and Capital Punishment were rated on several evalu­
ative scales. Correlations between the evaluative dimension 
of the Semantic Differential and Thurstone scale scores were 
.74, .82 and .81 respectively (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957, 
p. 194). Such findings further demonstrate the stability of the 
Thurstone scales over several years.
Of additional significance to the present study was the 
observation by Sherif and Hovland (1961; Hovlcmd & Sherif,
1952) that constriction of the latitude of acceptance reflects 
a tendency for highly involved subjects to make finer discrim­
inations between statements placed in the latitude of acceptance 
than between statements placed in the latitude of rejection:
. . .  individuals %Ao are highly ego-involved in an 
issue are often quite discriminating in placing items 
in a category corresponding to their own stand on the
—18—
Issue, but lump together all statements differing from 
their own stand at the end of the scale they reject 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961, p. 105).
Thus, with increased invèlvement in an issue, the individual
becomes more discriminating in his acceptance of statements
and more indiscriminate in his rejection of statements.
Rokeach (1954, 1960) makes a similar observation in his 
research on open and closed cognitive systems, contending that 
persons with more open systems display " . . .  relatively lit­
tle discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between be­
lief and disbelief systems" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 55). On the 
other hand, persons with closed cognitive systems tend to per­
ceive the world in terms of black or white with a " , . , 
great discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between 
belief and disbelief systems" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 56). Persons 
with open systems are capable of greater differentiation with­
in their disbelief systems. Thus, the more dogmatic or more 
ego-involved individual is less discriminating between stim­
uli that are placed within his latitude of rejection or dis­
belief system. Greater dogmatism results in dedifferentiation 
of disbelief systems, i.e., other disbelief systems are per­
ceived as similar, a phenomenon reflected in statements such 
as: "Communism and socialism are the same. Democrats and Re­
publicans are both run by Wall Street . . . "  (Rokeach, 1954^, 
p. 199). Further, there will be less knowledge of objects or 
statements idiich are rejected as compared to knowledge of ob­
jects, statements or events which are accepted as part of the
-19-
beli#f ayctWD. "Th« greater the dognatlsm the greater the 
diacrepancy between degree of knowledge of • • • eventa . . . 
atemming from the belief ayatem and any one of the diabelief 
aubaystema** (Rokeach, 1954, p. 198). Thia lack of knowledge 
apparently reault a from a tendency to avoid . contact
with atimuli . . . which threaten the validity of the belief 
ayatem . . . "  which comea with increaaed dogmatiam (Rokeach, 
1954, p. 200).
Another line of evidence pertaining to diacrimination of 
stimuli comea from atudies of perceptual learning by Gibaon 
and Gibaon (1955). Theae authora reported that " . . .  a 
atimulua atarta out by being indiatinguiahable from a vdiole 
claaa of itema in the atimulua univerae teated, and enda by 
being diatinguiahable from all of them" (p. 38). In aeveral 
experiments reported, subjects learned to make finer discrim­
inations between stimuli aa a reault of increaaed exposure to 
the given atimulua univerae. Gibson and Gibaon (1955) give aa 
an example of the tendency for discrimination to become finer 
with practice, the comparison between the wine connoisseur and 
the man whose wine repertoire is limited:
One man, let ua say, can identify sherry, champagne, 
idiite wine, and red wine. He has four percepts in 
response to the total possible range of stimulation.
Another man can identify a dozen types of sherry, 
each with many varieties, and numerous blends, and 
so on for the others. He has four thousand percepts 
in response to the range of stimulation (p. 35).
It waa a basis assumption of the present study that similar 
effects in terms of discrimination occur in the categorization
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of verbal 1 tarns onto psychosocial or attitude scales. A study 
by Ager and Dawes (1965) considered the effect of Judges' at­
titudes on discrimination. The measure of discrimination con­
sisted of the number of errors (failure to agree with a con­
sensus ordering) in paired comparison judgments of attitude 
statements. Ager and Dawes (1965) found that errors increased 
as a function of the distance of the statements from the sub­
ject's own position on the issue. Proscience raters demon­
strated a greater proportion of errors when discriminating 
between antiscience statements than between proscience state­
ments and vice versa.
White and Harvey (1965) report that authoritarian, dog­
matic or concrete subjects used more extreme and more widely 
dispersed categories in judgment of statements about the church, 
a finding Wiich reflects " . . .  a simple cognitive structure 
comprised of fewer differentiations and poor integrations" (p. 
338).
Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) contend that highly 
ego-involved subjects " . . .  bunch large numbers of items 
into categories objectionable to them" (p. 239), i.e., into the 
latitude of rejection, which reflects a tendency to discriminate 
more finely between items placed within the latitude of accept­
ance than between items placed within the latitude of rejection.
The present study utilized an extension of the "own cate­
gories" procedure (Sherif & Hovland, 1953; Sherif & Sherif,
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1964) and item# from tha acala of attltuda toward capital pun- 
iahmant deviaad by Pataraon (1931) to invaatigata bypothaaaa 
concamlng tha Influanca of diacrimination in tha aalactlon of 
Itama for attltuda acalaa.
Bypothaaaa
1(a) Whan glvan tha opportunity to aalact Itama or atatamanta 
from a larger number for tha conatruction of an attltuda 
acala to maaaura the general populace, aubjecta aalact a 
greater proportion of atatamanta from thalr latitude of 
acceptance than from their latitude of rejection. Thus, 
the mean proportion of statements drawn from the latitude 
of acceptance Is greater than the mean proportion of state­
ments drawn from the latitude of rejection.
1(b) Subjects select a greater number of statements from tha
latitude of acceptance than from the latitude of rejection. 
Thus, the mean number of statements chosen from the lati­
tude of acceptance Is greater than the mean number of 
statements chosen from the latitude of rejection.
2. Subjects will not select thalr most objectionable statement
for the construction of an attitude scale.
3. The range of Thurstone scale values of statements selected
from the latitude of acceptance Is smaller than the range 
of Thurstone scale values selected from the latitude of 
rejection, thus reflecting a tendency toward finer dis­
crimination between statements within the latitude of ac­
ceptance than between statements within the latitude of re-
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Jaction.
4. Subject* classified as hard moderates place a greater
number of statements in their latitude of rejection than 
soft moderates. Thus, the mean number of statements in 
the latitude of rejection will be greater for hard mod­
erates than for soft moderates.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Pre-test
A pre-test of two of the hypotheses was conducted prior 
to the 1968 Presidential election. The statements used to as­
sess attitudes toward the Presidential candidates were those 
used in previous studies by Sherif (I960) (Sherif, Sherif & 
Nebergall, 1965, p. 28). A sample of 137 subjects participated 
in the pre-test and results from this study tentatively sup­
ported hypotheses 1 and 3.
In order to test these hypotheses more adequately, a pre­
test was employed using Peterson's (1931) scale of attitudes 
toward capital punishment. The advantage of the capital punish­
ment scale over the statements about Presidential candidates 
used in the previous study is that scale values exist for the 
Peterson scale and there are a larger number of items. A pre­
test with 15 subjects was conducted and the results from this 
study tentatively supported hypotheses 1(a), 2 and 3. The 
sample was not of sufficient size to permit adequate test of 
hypotheses 1(b) and 4.
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Subjects
Subjects were 150 female undergraduate students obtained 
from introductory and advanced psychology courses at a liberal 
arts college during November, 1969. Subjects were asked to 
provide the following information: age, college major and clas­
sification. Subject participation was on a voluntary basis.
Subjects ranged in age from 18 to 25, however, 98 percent 
of the subject population fell within the ages of 19 to 21. 
Student classification of the subjects ranged from sophomore 
to senior with 86 percent of the subject population coming from 
the sophomore and junior classes. Of the 150 subjects who par­
ticipated in the present study, 148 were white and 2 were Negro. 
The majority of the student body are from middle class Protestant 
families. Due to the school's proximity to Washington, D. C. and 
various military installations, many of the students come from 
families in which the father is an employee of a Government 
agency or a military officer.
Materials
The issue chosen for the present study was capital punish­
ment. The attitude scale on the issue of capital punishment 
devised by Peterson (1931) (Peterson & Thurstone, 1933) was 
chosen. The scale contained 24 statements ranging from favor­
able to unfavorable on the issue of capital punishment (see Ap­
pendix A). Using the method of equal appearing intervals, 
Peterson (1931) derived scale values for each statement. These
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scale values ranged from 0.0 to 11 (Peterson & Thurstone, 1933, 
pp. 22-23).
Statements were presented to subjects on cards (4 cm. x 
10% cm.). On the back of each card was an identification num­
ber \diich corresponded to the number randomly assigned to that 
statement by Peterson (1931; Peterson & Thurstone, 1933).
Procedure
The own categories procedure of attitude assessment out­
lined by Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) was modified to 
determine subjects' latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non- 
commitment. Each subject was provided with two sets of 24 cards 
enclosed in a standard, white envelope (No. 10). Subjects were 
presented the statements with the following printed instructions 
which were read aloud:
Here are 24 cards containing statements about capital punishment.
Step 1: Read each statement carefully. Place the statements 
with vdiich you agree in a stack to your left. Place 
the statements with which you do not agree on your 
right. Place all remaining statements in a third 
stack, in the middle.
Step II: Place ONE CHECK MARK ( (/) by each statement that is AC­
CEPTABLE to you. Place ONE X MARK ( X ) by each state­
ment that is OBJECTIONABLE to you.
Step III:Find the ONE statement that is MOST ACCEPTABLE to you 
and place TWO CHECK MARKS (n/n/) on that card. Find the 
ONE statement that is MOST OBJECTIONABLE to you and 
place TWO X MARKS ( XX ) on that card.
Place all 24 cards together and enclose them in the 
envelope provided.
Subjects were then read the following paragraph before proceeding 
to Step IV:
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1 am Interested in public opinion about capital pun­
ishment and have presented you with a number of state­
ments from various sources. I feel that there may be 
some statements here which are unnecessary, or are not 
representative of the issue. Therefore, I would like 
for you to choose eleven statements which you feel 
are most representative of American public opinion con­
cerning capital punishment. I have provided you with 
a second group of 24 cards containing the same 24 
statements.
Step IV:Read the second group of statements. Select from 
these 24 statements the ELEVEN statements vdiich best 
represent the attitudes of the AMERICAN PUBLIC on the 
issue of capital punishment. Consider that public 
opinion will range from strongly favorable toward 
capital punishment to strongly opposed to it.
Step VzArrange these eleven statements on a continuum from 
pro (for) to anti (against) capital punishment.
Step VI:NUMBER these eleven statements from one (pro) to 
eleven (anti).
Step VII.‘Place all 24 cards together, enclose them with the 
rubber band provided, and put them in the envelope with 
the first group of cards.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Hypothesis 1(a) predicted that a greater proportion of 
statements would be selected from the latitude of acceptance 
than from the latitude of rejection. A t-test for dependent 
means (Walker & Lev, 1953) was used to test the null hypothe­
sis of no difference between proportion of statements drawn 
from the latitude of acceptance and proportion of statements 
drawn from the latitude of rejection. The mean difference 
between these proportions (mean difference = .2006) was 
significant in the predicted direction (t = 6.6681; df =
149; p .0005). The null hypothesis was rejected in favor 
of the alternate hypothesis that subjects select a greater 
proportion of statements from the latitude of acceptance than 
from the latitude of rejection. Table 1 presents a summary 
of the mean proportion and number of statements selected* 
from the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommit­
ment.
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Table 1
Mean Proportion and Number of Statements Selected 
from the Latitudes of Acceptance, 
Rejection and Noncommitment
Mean Response
Latitude of 
Acceptance
Latitude of 
Rejection
Latitude of 
Noncommitment
Proportion 
N = 150 .6063 .4056 .3679
Number 
N = 150 3.59 4.55 2.86
Subjects also selected a greater proportion of state­
ments from the latitude of acceptance than from the latitude 
of noncommitment. The mean difference between proportion 
(mean difference = .2384) of statements drawn from the lat­
itude of acceptance and proportion drawn from the latitude 
of noncommitmentwas significant (t = 8.147; df = 149; p 
.0005). Thus, subjects selected a greater proportion of 
statements from the latitude of acceptance than from the 
latitude of rejection and noncommitment. Table 2 presents 
a summary of the mean differences between proportion of 
statements drawn from the latitude of acceptance and the 
latitudes of rejection and noncommitment.
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Table 2
Mean Difference between Proportion of Statements 
Selected from the Latitude of Acceptance 
and the Latitudes of Rejection and 
Noncommitment
Mean Difference t P
LA - LR
N = 150 .2006 6.668 .0005
LA - LNC
N * 150 .2384 8.147 .0005
Hypothesis 1(b) predicted that in selecting items to be 
used to assess attitudes of the general public, subjects 
would select a greater number of statements from the lati­
tude of acceptance than from the latitude of rejection. A 
two-tailed t-test for dependent means (Walker & Lev, 1953) 
was used to test the null hypothesis of no difference between 
mean number of statements selected from the latitude of ac­
ceptance and mean number of statements selected from the 
latitude of rejection. The mean difference (mean difference 
■ -.9666) was significant (t * 3.5566; df * 149; p ^  .001) 
but not in the predicted direction. Subjects selected a 
greater number of statement from the latitude of rejection 
than from the latitude of acceptance. Thus, hypothesis 
1(b) was not supported. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
mean number of statements selected from the latitudes of 
acceptance, rejection and noncommitment. Inspection of
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Table 1 reveals that subjects selected the greatest number 
of statements from the latitude of rejection (mean = 4.55; 
SD = 2.43). A greater number of statements was selected 
from the latitude of acceptance (mean " 3.59; SD = 1.60) 
than from the latitude of noncommitment (mean = 2.86; SD = 
2.41) (t = 2.6995; df » 149; p < .01).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects would not choose 
the most objectionable statement for the eleven item scale. 
A sign test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test the null hy­
pothesis of an equal probability of subjects selecting 
their most objectionable position as not selecting their 
most objectionable position or statement. Of 150 subjects, 
39 did choose the most objectionable statement for the 
eleven item scale and 111 did not choose the most objection­
able statement. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected (z 
= 5.80; p ^ .00003) in favor of the alternate hypothesis 
that subjects would not choose the most objectionable po­
sition.
Of additional interest in regard to the second hypoth­
esis was the extent to which subjects did select their 
most acceptable statement for the eleven item scale. A 
sign test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test the null hypoth­
esis of an equal probability of subjects selecting the most 
acceptable statement as not selecting the most acceptable 
statement. Of 150 subjects, 33 did not choose their most
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acceptable statement for the eleven item scale and 117 did 
choose the most acceptable statement. This finding was also 
significant (z « -6.78; p ^.00003), thus indicating that 
subjects tend to select their most acceptable statement and 
do not select their most objectionable statement.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the mean range of Peterson 
(1931) scale values of statements selected from the latitude 
of acceptance would be smaller than the mean range of state­
ments selected from the latitude of rejection. In order to 
test this hypothesis, the range was determined in the fol­
lowing manner:
Range for the latitude of acceptance (Ria)• The range 
of statements ^  the latitude of acceptance was determined by 
subtracting the smallest scale value from the largest scale 
value in the latitude of acceptance (e.g., 3.4 - 0.0 = 3.4).
Range for the latitude of rejection (Rir). The range of 
statements jLn the latitude of rejection was determined by 
subtracting the smallest scale value from the largest scale 
value in the latitude of rejection (e.g., 11.0 - 6.2 = 4.8).
The same procedure was followed in determining the range 
for the eleven item scale. Of those statements chosen from 
the latitude of acceptance (Ra), the smallest scale value 
was subtracted from the largest scale value (e.g., 2.7 - 0.0 
= 2.7).
“ 32“
Of those items selected from the latitude of rejection 
(Rr)> the smallest scale value was subtracted from the 
largest scale value (e.g., 11.0 - 7.9 = 3.1).
In order to test the hypothesis that the range of items 
selected from the latitude of rejection was greater than the 
range of items selected from the latitude of acceptance, a 
final step was performed. The range of statements chosen 
from the latitude of acceptance (Ra) was subtracted from 
the range of statements falling within the latitude of ac­
ceptance (Ria) (e.g., 3.4 - 2.7 = 0.7; or Ria - Ra).
The range of statements chosen from the latitude of 
rejection (Rr) was subtracted from the range of statements 
falling within the latitude of rejection (Rlr) (e.g., 4.8 -
3.1 * 1.7; or Rlr - Rr).
A t-test for dependent means was used to test the null 
hypothesis that (Rlr - Rr * Ria - Ra)» or that there is no 
difference between the mean range of statements chosen from 
the latitude of rejection and the mean range of statements 
chosen from the latitude of acceptance. The null hypoth­
esis was rejected ( t = 7.8172; df * 149; p ^  .0005) in 
favor of the alternate hypothesis that the mean range of 
statements chosen from the latitude of rejection was 
greater than the mean range of statements chosen from the 
latitude of acceptance.
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Table 3 presents a stunmary of the mean ranges of scale 
values within the latitudes of acceptance (Ri«), rejection 
(Rlr) and noncommitment (Rinc)* Table 3 also presents the 
mean ranges of scale values of items selected from the lat­
itudes of acceptance (Ra), rejection (Rr) and noncommitment 
(Rnc)• Also included in Table 3 is the result of subtrac­
ting the ranges of items selected from the ranges of state­
ments within the latitudes of acceptance, rejection or non- 
commitment.
Table 3
Mean Ranges for the Latitudes of Acceptance, Rejection 
and Noncommi tment and Ranges for Items Selected 
from the Latitudes of Acceptance,
Rejection and Noncommitment
Mean Response
Latitude of 
Acceptance
Latitude of 
Rejection
Latitude of 
Noncommi tmen
Range (Rla,Rlr,Rlnc) 
N * 150 4.12 8.84 6.02
Range (Ra>Rr>Rnc)
N » 150 3.10 5.30 3.47
(Rla"Ra)»(Rlr“Rr)> 
(Rlnc-Rnc)
N = 150 1.02 3.54 2.55
It can be seen from Table 3 that the mean range within 
the latitude of rejection (mean = 8.84) exceeds the mean 
range within the latitude of acceptance (mean = 4.12) and
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within the latitude of noncommi tment (mean = 6,02). Also 
from Table 3, the mean range of statements selected from 
the latitude of rejection (mean = 5.30) exceeds the mean 
range of statements selected from the latitude of acceptance 
(mean = 3.10) and from the latitude of noncommi tment (mean = 
3.47). The mean difference between the range of scale 
values of statements selected from the latitude of rejec­
tion and the latitude of acceptance (Rlr-Rr) - (Rla-Ra) 
was significant (mean difference = 2.52), thus supporting 
the third hypothesis that the range of statements selected 
from the latitude of rejection is greater than the range of 
statements selected from the latitude of acceptance.
Of additional interest was the difference between the 
mean range of statements selected from the latitudes of ac­
ceptance and noncommi tment (mean difference = 1.53). The 
mean range of statements selected from the latitude of non­
commitment was greater than the mean range of statements 
selected from the latitude of acceptance (t = 6.3625; df = 
150; p ^.0005). Thus hypothesis 3 predicting a constricted 
scale value range between statements within and chosen from 
the latitude of acceptance was supported. The scale value 
ranges of statements selected from the latitudes of rejec­
tion and noncommi tment were significantly greater than the 
range of statements selected from the latitude of acceptance.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that hard moderates would place
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a greater number of statements in the latitude of rejection 
than soft moderates. In line with Hart's (1967) distinction 
between moderates and extremely committed subjects, moderates 
were those subjects who did not choose as most acceptable the 
two statements at either extreme of the 24 item Thurstone 
scale, i.e., who did not choose as most acceptable the state­
ments with scale values of 0.0, 0.1 or 10.4, 11.0 or the 
middle of the road statement, "It doesn't make any difference 
to me whether we have capital punishment or not" (scale value 
5.5).
Hard moderates were those subjects whose mean Peterson 
(1931) scale value (in relation to their most acceptable po­
sition) for the latitude of acceptance extended toward the 
extreme end of the scale representing their side of the issue. 
In other words, the latitude of acceptance extended away from 
the latitude of rejection and most objectionable statement.
Soft moderates were those subjects whose mean Peterson 
(1931) scale value (in relation to their most acceptable po­
sition) for the latitude of acceptance extended toward the 
extreme end of the scale representing the side of the issue 
opposite their own stand, i.e., the latitude of acceptance 
extended toward the most objectionable position.
Of 150 subjects, 52 were clearly defined as hard mod­
erates and 30 were clearly defined as soft moderates. Of the 
remaining 68 subjects, 27 were classified as not moderate
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because they chose as most acceptable one of the four extreme 
statements or the middle of the road statement. There was 
some difficulty in classifying the remaining 41 subjects be“ 
cause of the latitude of rejection. These 41 subjects had a 
latitude of rejection in which the most objectionable states 
ment and the mean of the latitude of rejection were at op“ 
posite ends of the 24 item scale, e.g., MO = 11.0; Mean LR 
= 1.86. In other words, these subjects rejected statements 
at both ends of the scale, and did so in such a way that the 
number of statements rejected was greater at the end of the 
scale opposite to their most objectionable statement. For 
this reason, there was some question as to which value was 
most important, the mean of the latitude of rejection or the 
most objectionable statement. However, in keeping with the 
original distinction between hard and soft moderates, these 
41 subjects were classified on the basis of the most objection* 
able position rather than on the basis of the mean of the lat“ 
itude of rejection. However, analysis of data derived from 
these subjects was separate from the analysis of the 82 
clearly defined hard and soft moderates.
A t-test for independent means (Walker & Lev, 1953) was 
used to test the null hypothesis of no difference between 
hard moderates and soft moderates in mean number of state­
ments allotted to the latitude of rejection. Hard moderates 
placed a greater number of statements (mean = 11.23) in the 
latitude of rejection than did soft moderates (mean = 9.27).
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The difference between herd and eoft moderates in mean num­
ber of statements placed in the latitude of rejection was 
significant in the predicted direction (mean difference «
1.96; t - 2.3657; df - 80; p <  .025).
Hart (1967) reported that soft moderates placed a 
greater number of statements in the latitude of noncommit­
ment than hard moderates. His findings were confirmed in 
the present study. Soft moderates placed a greater number 
of statements (mean = 8.77) in the latitude of noncommi tment 
than hard moderates (mean = 6.38). The difference between 
soft and hard moderates in mean number of statements placed 
in the latitude of noncommitment was significant (mean dif­
ference ■* 2.39; t = 2.3206; df = 80; p ^ .025).
However, vdien the clearly defined hard and soft mod­
erates were combined with the questionable hard and soft 
moderates, the difference between hard and soft moderates in 
number of statements allotted to the latitude of rejection 
was not significant (meanhm - mean sta = .56) (t = .8144; df 
= 121; p^.lO). The two groups of hard moderates placed a 
greater number of statements in the latitude of rejection 
(mean = 11.52) than the two groups of soft moderates (mean 
= 10.96), but the difference between the means was not sig­
nificant. Table 4 presents a summary of the mean number of 
statements placed in the latitudes of acceptance, rejection 
and noncommi tment by hard and soft moderates, questionable
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hard and soft moderate#, and extreme subject#• Table 4 al­
so presents a summary of the mean number of statements placed 
in the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommitment 
by the total group of subjects (N • 150), The mean number 
of statements allotted to the latitude of rejection (mean 
" 10.99) was greater for all subjects than the mean number 
of statements allotted to the latitude of noncommi tment 
(mean = 6.86) and the latitude of acceptance (mean = 6.15).
Table 4
Mean Number of Statements Placed in the Latitudes of 
Acceptance, Rejection and Noncommi tment by 
Hard Moderates, Soft Moderates, Extreme 
Subjects and Questionable Hard 
and Soft Moderates
Hard Moderates
Mean Response
Latitude ot Latitude of Latitude of 
Acceptance Rejection Noncommi tment
N = 52 6.38 11.23 6.38
Soft Moderates 
N * 30 5.97 9.27 8.77
Extreme Subjects 
N - 27 6.78 9.74 7.48
Hard Moderates (?) 
N « 13 5.46 12.69 5.85
Soft Moderates (?) 
N = 28 5.64 12.79 5.57
All Subjects 
N = 150 6.15 10.99 6.86
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study Indicate that an indi* 
vidual's acceptance or rejection of a statement is a signif* 
icant source of bias in the selection of statements for the 
construction of an attitude scale to be presented to the 
general public. In addition, the data from this study sug­
gest that individuals make finer discriminations between ac­
ceptable statements than between objectionable statements, 
thus supporting conclusions from earlier studies regarding 
the influence of judges' attitudes on the construction of 
attitude scales (Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 
1953). In addition, the data from the present study sup­
port findings reported by Hart (1967) in regard to the size 
of the latitudes of rejection and noncommitment of persons 
taking a moderate stand on an issue.
The first hypothesis predicted that vdien given the 
opportunity to select statements for an attitude scale to 
be presented to the general public, subjects would select a 
greater proportion of statements from the latitude of ac­
ceptance than from the latitude of rejection. This hypoth­
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esis was confirmed. Subjects selected a significantly great­
er proportion of statements from the latitude of acceptance 
than from their latitudes of rejection or noncommitment.
These findings suggest that an attitude scale may be dis­
proportionately weighted with the acceptable statements of 
the individual constructing the scale. This interpretation 
was supported by hypothesis 2 which predicted that subjects 
would not select their most objectionable statement. Seventy- 
four percent of the subjects did not select their most ob­
jectionable statement for the eleven item scale to assess 
attitudes of the general public on the issue of capital 
punishment. On the other hand, 78 percent of the subjects 
did select their most acceptable statement. These findings 
suggest that in constructing an attitude scale, the individual 
will not extend the limits of the scale to include his own 
most objectionable statement, but will include his most ac­
ceptable statement.
Hypothesis 1(b) predicted that subjects would select a 
greater number of statements from their latitude of accept­
ance than from their latitude of rejection. This prediction 
was not supported by the data. On the average, subjects al­
lotted eleven statements to their latitude of rejection and 
selected 5 from the latitude of rejection; subjects allotted 
six statements to the latitude of acceptance and selected 
four statements from the latitude of acceptance. Therefore, 
subjects selected a greater proportion of statements from the
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latltude of acceptance but a greater number of statements 
from the latitude of rejection. Therefore, hypothesis 1(b) 
was not supported by the data. However, these findings are 
consistent with the contention by Sherif and Hovland (1961) 
that a large latitude of rejection and small latitude of ac­
ceptance reflect a raised threshold of acceptance or increased 
discrimination in regard to acceptable statements. Thus, the 
tendency for subjects to select a greater number of statements 
from the latitude of rejection than from the latitude of ac­
ceptance suggests that subjects are more discriminating about
items selected from the latitude of acceptance than from the 
latitude of rejection.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that finer discrimination in re­
gard to acceptable statements would be reflected in a greater 
range of Peterson (1931) scale values of statements selected
from the latitude of rejection than from the latitude of ac­
ceptance. The data from the present study confirmed this hy­
pothesis and revealed that the mean range of scale values 
within the latitude of rejection was greater than within the 
latitude of acceptance, and further, that the mean range of 
scale values of statements selected from the latitude of re­
jection was significantly greater than the mean range of scale 
values selected from the latitude of acceptance. In addition, 
the mean range of scale values of statements selected from 
the latitude of noncommitment was significantly greater than 
the mean range of scale values of statements selected from
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the latitude of acceptance. These findings lend support to 
the interpretation offered by Sherif and Hovland (1961) to ex­
plain the tendency for the size of the latitude of rejection 
to increase with increased involvement in an issue. It is the 
contention of these authors that persons are more discrim­
inating about statements they accept than about statements 
they reject. Such discrimination is reflected in a constric­
tion of the latitude of acceptance and expansion of the lati­
tude of rejection. The finding in the present study that 
the range of scale values of statements selected from the 
latitudes of rejection and noncommitment was greater than the 
range of scale values of statements selected from the latitude 
of acceptance lends support to the interpretation by Sherif 
and Hovland (1961). Thus the constriction of the range of 
scale values in the latitude of acceptance implies that the 
subject is more discriminating about acceptable items than 
about items that are objectionable or neutral.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that subjects classified as hard 
moderates would allot a greater number of statements to the 
latitude of rejection than soft moderates. This prediction 
was based on a study by Hart (1967) which indicated that hard 
moderates display a greater latitude of rejection and smaller 
latitude of noncommitment than soft moderates. Hart's (1967) 
results were confirmed in the present study. Subjects vdio 
were clearly defined as hard moderates placed significantly 
more statements in their latitude of rejection than soft
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moderates, while the mean number of statements placed in the 
latitude of noncommi tment was significantly greater for soft 
moderates than for hard moderates, thus reflecting a tendency 
for soft moderates to be less involved than hard moderates. 
Hart (1967) also reported that his subjects accepted a great­
er number of statements than they rejected. His findings re­
garding the mean number of statements in the latitude of ac­
ceptance relative to the latitude of rejection were not con­
firmed in the present study. Data from the present study re­
vealed that subjects placed a greater number of statements in 
the latitude of rejection than in the latitudes of acceptance 
or noncommitment. The discrepancy between results of the 
present study in regard to the size of the latitude of accept­
ance and results of Hart's (1967) could be due to the compo­
sition of the samples involved in both studies, or could be due 
to differences in the issues chosen for the studies. Further 
research might clarify the discrepancy.
The results of the present study can be extended to the 
problem of experimenter bias in research. The findings that 
subjects select a greater proportion of acceptable statements 
and make finer discriminations between acceptable statements 
indicate that a similar bias could occur in the selection of 
data. The experimenter might select data that would validate 
his hypothesis or overlook or fail to report data that would 
invalidate his hypothesis. Such bias could also determine the 
type of research done, in that if an experimenter should be
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partlcularly hostile or antagonistic toward a specific theo­
retical approach, he might overlook or reject significant 
aspects of that theory or research which might be relevant to 
his own position.
Sherif (1963) has stressed the need for an inter-dis­
ciplinary approach in the social sciences to avoid the pit­
falls of ethnocentrism. Other psychologists (Ome, 1962; 
Rosenthal, Persinger, Vikan-Kline & Fode, 1963; Rosenthal, 
1964; Rosenthal, Kohn, Greenfield & Carota, 1966) have con­
sidered the problem of experimenter bias in influencing the 
results of psychological research and have stressed the need 
for controls of such bias.
This is not to say that research in social science is 
hopelessly biased in terms of the "limited perspective" of 
the experimenter. If generalizations from the present study 
are permitted, the results would indicate that there is a 
tendency for a subject (or possibly an experimenter) to in­
clude information or evidence that is objectionable or contra­
dictory to an hypothesis, as demonstrated by the tendency for 
subjects to include a greater number of statements from the 
latitude of rejection than from the latitudes of noncommi tment 
and acceptance. However, there is also a definite tendency to 
exclude information that is extremely objectionable, as evi­
denced by the tendency for subjects to exclude their most 
objectionable position (or the most objectionable information).
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In addition, if one can generalize from the present 
data, the tendency for subjects to make finer discriminations 
among acceptable statements indicates that a great deal may 
be gained from the tendency of the researcher to make fine 
discriminations in his data. He may notice things and gen­
erate ideas and information which might go undetected by a 
person unfamiliar with the research topic. However, because 
of a tendency to make less fine discriminations about objection, 
able information, the experimenter might overlook or reject 
information which might invalidate his hypothesis.
In regard to the findings on hard and soft moderate sub­
jects, this information would be of relevance to social sci­
entists involved in the problem of attitude or opinion change. 
The tendency for soft moderates to reject fewer statements 
indicates less involvement in the issue, and therefore great­
er susceptibility to attitude change in the face of propa­
ganda. However, hard moderates, by their rejection of a 
greater number of statements, indicate greater commitment to 
their position and less susceptibility to communications ad­
vocating opinion or attitude change. Further research is 
needed to determine the most effective means of bringing a- 
bout attitude change in moderate subjects.
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY
The purpose of the present study was to describe trends 
in the selection of items for the construction of an atti­
tude scale to be presented to the general public. Of major 
interest was the influence of the process of discrimination 
in the selection of these items or statements. The issue 
chosen was capital punishment and procedures of attitude as­
sessment devised by Thurstone (1928), Sherif and Hovland (1952), 
and Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) were modified to as­
sess attitudes of subjects toward the issue of capital punish­
ment.
The subjects were 150 undergraduate students at a small 
liberal arts college. Subjects ware to indicate their ac­
ceptable and objectionable positions in a 24 item Thurstone 
scale on the issue of capital punishment (Peterson, 1931) and 
then to select from these statements the eleven statements 
vrtiich would best assess attitudes of the American public on 
the issue of capital punishment.
The data from the present study supported the major hy­
pothesis and indicated that subjects select a greater pro-
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portion of statements from the latitude of acceptance than 
from the latitude of rejection (p <1 .0005) and from the lat­
itude of noncommitment (p ^  .0005). The results of the pres­
ent study also indicate that in selecting statements for an 
attitude scale, subjects will not select their most objection­
able statement and will select their most acceptable state­
ment. Of 150 subjects, 111 did not choose their most ob­
jectionable statement and 117 did choose their most accept­
able statement for the eleven item scale.
The data for the present study supported the third hy­
pothesis vdiich predicted a constricted range of scale values 
of acceptable statements as a measure of discrimination. The 
mean scale value range of statements selected from the lat­
itude of rejection was significantly greater than the mean 
scale value range of statements selected from the latitude of 
acceptance (p .0005). The mean scale value range of state­
ments selected from the latitude of noncommitment was also 
significantly greater than the mean scale value range of the 
latitude of acceptance (p ^  .0005).
Of additional interest in the present study was the 
verification of findings by Hart (1967) regarding moderate 
subjects. In the present study, moderates were classified 
on the basis of the mean scale value of the latitude of ac­
ceptance in relation to the most acceptable and most objec­
tionable statements. Subjects were classified as soft
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moderates if the mean scale value for the latitude of ac­
ceptance (in relation to the most acceptable position) ex­
tended toward the extreme end of the scale representing the 
side of the issue opposite their own stand. Subjects were 
classified as hard moderates if the mean scale value for 
the latitude of acceptance (in relation to the most accept­
able position) extended away from the most objectionable po­
sition. Results indicated that hard moderates place a great­
er number of statements in the latitude of rejection than 
soft moderates (p ^  .025), and that soft moderates place a 
greater number of statements in the latitude of noncommitment 
than hard moderates (p ^  .025).
In summary, data from the present study support con­
clusions from earlier studies regarding the influence of 
judges' attitudes on the construction of attitude scales 
(Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953) and indi­
cate that individuals are more discriminating about items 
that are acceptable than about items that are objectionable. 
The data also support findings reported by Hart (1967) in re­
gard to the number of statements placed in the latitudes of 
rejection and noncommi tment by persons taking soft and hard 
moderate stands on an issue.
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APPENDIX A
Twenty-four Statements Used in Present Study 
to Assess Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment
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Peterson (1931) scale for assessing attitudes toward capital 
punishment (Peterson & Thurstone, 1933, pp. 22-23).
Scale stmt.
Value No. Statement
7.2 1. Capital punishment may be wrong but it is the
best preventative to crime.
0.0 2. Capital punishment is absolutely never Justified.
6.2 3. I think capital punishment is necessary but I
wish it were not.
10.4 4. Any person, man or woman, young or old, %dio com­
mits murder, should pay with his own life.
2.4 5. Capital punishment cannot be regarded as a sane
method of dealing with crime.
6.2 6. Capital punishment is wrong but it is necessary
in our imperfect civilization.
11.0 7. Every criminal should be executed.
2.7 8. Capital punishment has never been effective in
preventing crime.
5.4 9. I don't believe in capital punishment but I'm not
sure it isn't necessary.
8.5 10. We must have capital punishment for some crimes.
3.9 *11. I think physical punishment would be more effec­
tive than capital punishment.
0.& 12. I do not believe in capital punishment under any
circumstances.
3.0 13. Capital punishment is not necessary in modem
civilization.
1.5 14 We can't call ourselves civilized as long as we
have capital punishment.
3.4 15. Life imprisonment is more effective than capital
punishment.
0.9 16. Execution of criminals is a disgrace to civilized
society.
9.6 17. Capital punishment is just and necessary.
5.8 18. I do not believe in capital punishment but it is
not practically advisable to abolish it.
0.6 19. Capital punishment is the most hideous practice
of our time.
9.4 20. Capital punishment gives the criminal vdiat he
deserves.
2.0 21. The state cannot teach the sacredness of human
life by destroying it.
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Scale Stmt.
Valu# No. Statement
5.5 22. It doesn't make any difference to me whether we
have capital punishment or not.
7.9 23. Capital punishment is justified only for pre­
meditated murder.
9.1 24. Capital punishment should be used more often than
it is.
* Statement number 11 was worded by Peterson as follows;
I think the return of the whipping post would be more 
effective than capital punishment.
APPENDIX B
Responses of Subjects, Latitudes of 
Acceptance, Rejection and Noncommitment 
and Eleven Statements
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APPENDIX B 
Latitude of Acceptance
Columns 1,2,3; 
Columns 5,6; 
Columns 8
Subject Identification
Most acceptable statement
Statements designated as also acceptable
^Reference should be made to Appendix A 
to convert statement number to scale 
value or to identify a statement.
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
001 09 01 17 03 21 06 18 10
002 21 09 15 05 14
003 03 10 15 17 20 24
004 03 23 01 10 20
005 02 05 16 14 18 15 19 21
006 21 14 23 15 09 05 16
007 03 18 09 16 23 10 06 11
008 09 03 10 18 23 06
009 09 18 21 08 10 03
010 18 21 06 05 23 09 03
011 09 23 20 10 15 14 03 18
012 21 02 03 06 10 23
013 11 15 13 16 02 19 12 08 07 18 21
014 12 05 14 16 08 02 13 19 21 15
015 21 08 16 05 09 13 15 14
016 12 05 13 19 02 21 16 14
017 10 01 03 15 24 06
018 15 13 21
019 16 02 14 21 15 05 13 12 08 19
020 12 05 21 16 02 13 14 19
021 03 06 09 18
022 15 10 17 21
023 15 03 08 10
024 12 08 05 15 13 16 21 18 02
025 12 21 16 13 08 02 05
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
026 23 03 06 10 15 17 20
027 15 02 05 12 21 16 13
028 03 10 01 04 21
029 09 03 18 01 10 21
030 03 10 17
031 18 06 03 23 10 15 09
032 21 15 16 02 12
033 03 06 10 18
034 09 03 01 10 18 06
035 09 18 15 05 08 03 11 10 06
036 21 02 16 12 13
037 03 06 23 10 18 09
038 09 21 06 05 23 10 03 18
039 08 05 16 14 21 13 12 02
040 12 02 13 15
041 10 03 17
042 15 20 03 11 23 10
043 09 10 03 18 15
044 03 18 17 06 24 10
045 15 21 05 12 08 11 14 13
046 21 05 08 16 13
047 21 13 12 02 16 15 08
048 03 10 24
049 21 05 08 16 14 15 12 02
050 05 02 16 13 12 08
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
051 12 15 08 02 13 14 05 16 21
052 08 02 12
053 05 13 02 21 16
054 14 21 16 23 03 18 20 09
055 03 15 01 06 10 23 24 17 20 04
056 10 01 03 06 17 23
057 06 03 10 15 20 23 24 17 01
058 09 10 15 18 23
059 15 08 06 03 01 10 13 18 23
060 21 02 05 08 12 13 14 16 19
061 10 20 24 17 03
062 03 20 17 10 24
063 03 06 14 17 23 10
064 06 10 01 03 24 23 17
065 12 02 14 05 15 19 21 13 16 08
066 21 13 12
067 15 21 01
068 12 08 02 21
069 01 09 18
070 03 06 08 09 10 18 21 23
071 15 11 21
072 10 20 24 17 04 03 01 06
073 03 10 23 24 17
074 13 05 11 15
075 18 23 17 15 10 09 03 22
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
076 15 08 09 21 18 12 11
077 11 03 08 10 17 23 24
078 03 10 20 23 24 17
079 15 13 18 22 23 08
080 10 09 18 03
081 09 15 13 10 05 06 08 18 14 03 21
082 15 16 13 05 19 21 14
083 06 20 10 03 15
084 05 13 14 16 19 21 02 12 15
085 18 15 23 11 10 03 06
086 15 13 12 02
087 06 03 18 10 23 01
088 08 15 13 09 21
089 03 10 23 09 06
090 09 08 18 23
091 06 01 03 09 10 17 it 23 24
092 15 21 23 18 11 09 06 01
093 15 10 18 09 11
094 12 16 14 05 15 09
095 12 16 14 21 19 13 05 08 15 09
096 10 17 03 23 24 20
097 13 08 21 05 14 19 16 12 02 15
098 15 13 09 03 08 23
099 21 05 13 08 16 14 12 02 19
100 09 03 06 18 21
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
101 09 15 21 13
102 15 13 08 05 21 14 16
103 21 15 13 08 14
104 21 18 09 15 05
105 12 13 21 16
106 12 15 13 08 05 21 14 16 02
107 15 09 13 08 05 21
108 12 15 13 08 21 14 02
109 10 17 24 06
110 09 10 23 18 08 05 21
111 02 21 14 16 19 12
112 03 23 06 01 18
113 02 16 21 14 08 05 15 13
114 09 23 18 03
115 05 16 21 15
116 02 12
117 12 15 05 02 13 19 21 16 14
118 09 18 01 20 03 23 17 06 10
119 03 23 09 06 12 14 15
120 21 02 19 05 13 15 16 08 12 14
121 03 10 01 23 18
122 22 10 03 06
123 03 01 16 10 04 17 24 20 07
124 18 09 05 21 08
125 18 09 05 08 21
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S MA Latitude of Acceptance
126 02 13 15 21 16 12 19
127 12 09 08 21
128 10 03 18 22 08 06 09
129 15 10 22 08 18
130 15 21 14
131 08 15 14 21 05 13
132 08 23 18 22 15 09 13 21
133 10 03 01 24 17
134 09 01 06 18
135 21 13 05 15
136 03 10 23 06
137 03 20 21 24 01
138 24 17 10 23 03
139 03 10 06 18
140 24 03 10 17 20 06
141 02 12 21 05 16 08 14 13 19
142 10 01
143 17 04 24
144 12 02 05 21 08 15 13
145 12 02 05 21 13 08
146 12 08 13
147 14 21 15 09 11 05 16
148 15 21 19
149 08 15 13 02 19 21 14 05 16
150 12 02 21 05 13
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APPENDIX B 
Latitude of Rejection
Columns 1,2,3; Subject identification
Columns 5,6; Most objectionable statement
Columns 8 -: Statements designated as also objectionable
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
001 07 04 20 11 02 22 24 08 12 19 05
002 20 17 22 10 03 06 08 04 24 07 23
003 19 02 04 05 07 12 13 14 16 21 23
004 07 02 16 13 14 21 19 11 15 12 04 24 05 08
005 20 23 10 11 01 04 24 07 17
006 04 06 01 03 17 20 07 24
007 07 05 13 08 19 02 15 24
008 07 13 12 11 04 02 24
009 20 12 22 24 11 17 15 01 02 19 07 04
010 07 17 04 20 08 01 24 22
011 04 19 05 02 13 17 12 07 24 11 06 22 01
012 07 04 09 13 16 17 20 22
013 20 17 24 10 06 03 23 04 05 01
014 04 22 24 17 01 06 07 20 10 23 03 18
015 07 17 04 12 03 19 06 01 10 24
016 07 01 04 17 03 09 06 23 10 24 20 18
017 07 05 16 17 14 11 20 04 13 19 12 02 23
018 04 01 02 03 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 14 16 17 18 20 22 23 24
019 07 20 01 11 23 24 17 04 10
020 17 10 20 07 24 01 06 04
021 07 20 02 05 19 11 22 14 16 04
022 11 02 04 05 07 09 12 13 19 23 24
023 04 13 16 11 05 09 01 12 02 20 24 17 18 22 14 07
024 07 20 22 04 11 01 24 17 06 03
025 07 14 18 03 01 23 24 04 20 10 17 22 06 15
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
026 07 02 04 05 11 12 13 14 16 19 21 22 24
027 07 24 17 19 04 22 20 11 08 23 10 01
028 24 02 08 23 22 18 14 13 09 06 11 05 12 16
029 04 17 24 12 19 02 22 07 16 05 13 08 06 14
030 16 05 08 23 02 12 15 07 04
031 07 14 24 16 05 11 20 19 13 12 02 01 04
032 07 18 11 19 10 04 20 24
033 07 19 11 08 12 20 24 16 02 22 04 13 14 01 09
034 07 13 02 05 12 22 14 04 19
035 07 04 01 24 20 13 16 19 02 17
036 07 09 18 06 22 01 03 04 23 10 20 05 24 11 17 14 19
037 02 19 12 07 04
038 04 17 20 08 16 14 11 13 07 24 15 12
039 07 06 09 10 17 24 22 18 11 03 04 01 20
040 17 07 04 06 11 23 24 19 18 09 01 22 03 10 20
041 07 15 05 21 12 19 02 11 24 08 13
042 07 05 14 16 13 08 06 18 02 12 17 19 24 22 01
043 07 24 08 19 01 02 22 04 20 17
044 02 19 05 14 08 13 04 15 11 16 07 12
045 07 04 24 20 10 03 01 23 17 19
046 07 15 10 04 17 22 11 24 20 19
047 07 09 04 03 22 24 11 20 01 10 17 06 18 23
048 07 13 09 05 16 08 06 18 17 22 15 19 14 12 02 04 01 20 11
049 07 18 04 20 10 23 06 17 11 24 19 01
050 07 06 20 11 24 04 17 10 03 01 22 19 18 09 23
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
051 07 24 04 06 II 01 20 09 22 03 18 23 10 17
052 01 15 18 23 09 03 20 24 04 11 10 17 07
053 20 24 17 06 01 03 07 04 15 22
054 07 22 17 04 06 15 11 12 19 24 02 13 10 01 05 08
055 21 14 16 12 19 02 05 08 13 09 22 11 07 18
056 02 04 07 08 12 21 13 19 22 09
057 02 05 08 11 12 13 14 16 18 19 04 07
058 07 02 05 08 11 14 16 17 19 20 24 04 01
059 07 02 04 11 14 16 20 21 24
060 07 03 06 09 10 11 17 22 23 24
061 07 23 21 19 16 14 13 12 11 08 05 04 22 02
062 07 04 23 22 21 19 18 16 15 14 13 12 11 09 08 06 05 01 02
063 12 02 07 13 16 19 21 24
064 07 05 04 15 19 13 22 18 16 14 12 11 09 08 02
065 04 06 11 17 24 10 23 20 01 07
066 07 23 22 19 18 17 10 08 20 01 04 06 24
067 07 23 04 08 11 17 20 24
068 07 06 20 23 24 15 17 04 10 11 03 22 01 09 18
069 04 21 11 03 05 06 10 12 13 14 15 16 19 20 22 23 24 02 08 
17 07
070 07 01 02 05 11 12 13 14 15 20 24 04
071 07 24 22 20 17 04 06 01
072 02 12 13 14 16 07 08 11 18 19 21 23
073 07 02 04 05 09 11 12 14 15 22 21 19 16 13
074 07 01 02 04 06 17 20 23 24 22 18
075 07 04 24 11 01 02 12 13 14 16 21 05
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
076 07 22 01 03 05 06 04 20 17
077 15 21 22 16 18 19 14 13 12 09 07 06 05 04 02 01 20
078 07 02 05 06 08 09 11 12 13 14 16 18 19 21 22 01 04
079 04 01 24 17 16 03 14 20 06 07 10 05
080 07 19 15 24 14 23 22 20 16 11 02 08 12 05 04
081 07 16 19 20 22 24 23 01 11 02 12 17 04
082 07 17 10 24 06 03 18 20 22 01 08 09 04
083 07 08 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24 01 04 02
084 07 20 04 11 17 24 03 10 23 22 09 06 18
085 07 02 04 05 12 14 16 19 22 24 13 20 17
086 07 04 24 20 22 17 11 06 10 23 01 03
087 07 20 19 17 16 14 12 11 02 04 22 13 24
088 04 01 03 06 18 10 16 17 20 23 24 07 11 22
089 04 01 02 05 07 08 11 12 13 14 16 18 20 21 22 24 19
090 07 01 02 04 12 17 19 20 22 24
091 07 02 04 05 08 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 20 21 22
092 20 07 12 13 24 17 04 05 19
093 07 05 14 16 02 08 12 22 24 04 20 17
094 07 17 20 24 23 01 22 11
095 07 17 04 20 24 06 01 03 10
096 07 18 11 15 08 06 13 09 21 05 02 12 14 16 19 22 04
097 07 17 04 10 20 24 01 23 06 03 22 18 09 11
098 07 14 19 16 24 04
099 07 04 20 17 10 23 24 18 03 22 11
100 07 04 17 20 24 19 12 02
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
101 20 10 23 01 03 06 18
102 07 04 17 20 24 10 23 01 06 03 18 22 09 11 19 12 02
103 07 04 17 24 20 06 01 03
104 07 10 04 12 06 03
105 07 24 17 20 04
106 07 24 17 20 04 01 23 10 11 03
107 07 11 01 17 24 20 04
108 07 17 20 04
109 07 15 11 04 08 13 05 21 16 14 12 19 02
110 07 17 24 20 04
111 07 17 24 04
112 15 17 20 04 24 07 21 16 12 19 08 05
113 07 06 18 03 11 10 23 01 20 17 24 04
114 07 02 19 12 14 16 08 21 01 11 20 17 24 04
115 07 20 04
116 07 18 04 01 03 17 10 24 20 23 06
117 07 23 24 10 20 04 01 18 22 03 09 06 11
118 14 07 11 24 15 04 05 08 13 02 12 16 19
119 07 08 01 04 24
120 17 07 20 24 04 01 10 23 18 22 06 09 03 11
121 07 02 16 12 19 04
122 07 02 19 12 05 16 01 11 04 20
123 02 12 16 19 14 21 08 05 13 15 11 22 09 18 23
124 07 04 17
125 07 17 04 24 20 01 10
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S MO Latitude of Rejection
126 07 04 17 20 24 10 23 01
127 07 20 23 04
128 07 17 20 23 24 04 01 11 13 15 21 05 16 14 12 19 02
129 07 02 19 12 16 14 01 20 24 17 04
130 07 24 20 17 04
131 07 17 24 20 04 23 10 01 06 18 22 03 11 19 02 12 16
132 07 19 03 11 10 24 17 20 04
133 07 11 15 08 05 14 16 19 12 02
134 07 17 05 11 24
135 07 06 24 17 20 04
136 07 02 12 19 16 14 11 04
137 07 02 12 19 11 22 04
138 02 12 14
139 07 24 22 11 15
140 21 16 14 13 04 07 12 08 19 15 11 05 02
141 07 03 09 18 01 23 10 06 20 24 22 04 17
142 07 04 24 17 11 08 05 16 19
143 07 14 12 19
144 07 17 20 04 24 01 10
145 07 04 17 24 20 10 06 01
146 20 04 17 24 10 01 07
147 17 01 24 04 06
148 07 17 04 24 20 10 01 23 06 22 03 18 11 09
149 07 11 18 22 09 03 01 06 23 10 17 24 20 04
150 07 11 22 18 23 01 06 10 24 04 17
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APPENDIX B 
Latitude of Noncommitment
Columns 1,2,3: 
Columns 5 -:
Subject identification
Statements not designated as acceptable 
or objectionable
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S Latitude of Noncommitment
001 15 14 13 16 23
002 13 16 11 02 01 12 18 19
003 01 06 08 09 11 18 22
004 18 06 22 09 17
005 08 03 22 06 13 12 09
006 13 11 08 02 12 22 18 10 19
007 12 17 04 01 22 14 21 20
008 01 05 08 14 15 16 17 19 20 21 22
009 23 13 06 14 16 05
010 02 19 12 16 13 11 10 15 14
011 16 21 08
012 01 05 08 11 12 14 15 18 19 24
013 14 09 22
014 09 11
015 02 20 11 18 22 23
016 22 11 15 08
017 22 21 08 09 18
018 05 19
019 06 22 09 03 18
020 11 08 15 23 22 18 09 03
021 12 21 15 13 08 23 10 24 17 01
022 01 03 06 08 14 16 18 20 22
023 06 19 21 23
024 10 14 09 23 19
025 09 19 11
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S Latitude of Noncommitment
026 01 08 09 IB
027 06 03 14 18 09
028 15 17 07 20 19
029 23 20 15 11
030 20 14 13 24 21 22 06 18 11 19 01 09
031 21 22 08 17
032 17 01 09 03 14 08 06 22 05 13 23
033 23 17 21 05 15
034 21 08 11 20 17 24 23 16 15
035 14 12 21 22 23
036 08 15
037 14 16 05 22 08 13 11 15 21 01 20 24 17
038 22 02 01 19
039 15 23 19
040 21 14 16 05 08
041 09 14 22 16 18 06 01 23 20 04
042 04 09 21
043 23 14 12 21 11 16 06 05 13
044 22 09 01 21 23 20
045 22 09 02 16 06 18
046 03 23 01 09 18 14 06 02 12
047 14 05 19
048 21 23
049 13 22 09 03
050 15 14 21
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S Latitude of Noncommitment
051 19
052 05 21 19 14 06 22 13 16
053 19 14 12 11 09 18 10 23 08
054
055
056 11 15 20 18 05 14 16 24
057 09 22 21
058 22 21 13 06 03 12
059 22 19 17 12 09 05
060 01 04 15 18 20
061 18 01 15 09 06
062
063 01 04 05 08 09 11 18 20 22 15
064 20 21
065 03 09 22 18
066 15 14 11 09 05 03 02 16
067 03 22 06 10 16 14 13 18 19 09 05 02 12
068 16 19 05 14 13
069
070 22 19 17 16
071 02 03 05 08 09 10 12 13 14 16 18 19 23
072 22 09 05 15
073 20 18 08 06 01
074 03 08 09 10 12 14 16 19 21
075 06 08 19 20
-75-
S Latitude of Noncommitment
076 24 19 14 10 02 23 13 16
077
078 15
079 12 02 21 19 11 09
080 01 13 06 21 17
081
082 11 12 02 23
083 05 16 17 19 09 18
084 08 01
085 01 08 21 09
086 18 19 21 16 14 08 05 09
087 09 15 05 08 21
088 19 12 14 05 02
089 17 15
090 03 05 06 10 11 13 14 15 16 21
091
092 02 03 08 10 14 16 22
093 23 21 19 06 03 01 13
094 04 10 06 03 18 13 08 21 19 02
095 02 18 22 23 11
096 01
097
098 21 12 02 05 11 18 22 01 06 10 17 20
099 15 09 01 06
100 01 05 13 10 15 08 16 11 22 14 23
—7 6“
S Latitude of Noncommitment
101 08 11 04 16 14 07 17 02 12 05 19 22 24
102
103 05 10 12 16 09 22 23 11 19 02 18
104 08 13 11 17 02 16 14 20 01 23 19 22 24
105 23 15 11 19 10 14 09 22 08 06 05 18 02 03 01
106 09 18 19 22 06
107 02 06 12 16 19 03 14 10 18 22 23
108 16 19 22 03 10 18 01 24 06 11 05 09 23
109 01 09 20 23 18 22 03
110 03 06 11 22 19 16 02 12 14 15 01 13
111 01 05 10 15 06 11 03 20 09 18 13 08 22 23
112 09 14 11 22 10 13 02
113 09 12 22 19
114 06 10 13 05 15 22
115 24 19 10 12 22 14 17 11 23 13 18 08 01 09 02 06 03
116 05 09 16 19 14 21 08 15 11 13 22
117 08 17
118 22 21
119 02 10 13 17 05 22 20 11 21 16 19 18
120
121 14 08 21 11 05 15 13 09 22 06 24 17 20
122 09 23 24 08 18 13 14 21 15 17
123
124 14 02 16 19 12 11 13 15 22 24 06 20 23 01 03 10
125 03 16 22 06 23 14 13 19 02 15 11 12
-77-
S Latitude of Noncommitment
126 14 09 11 05 18 03 08 06 22
127 02 14 19 16 13 11 15 22 18 03 01 06 10 24 17 05
128
129 21 05 13 11 09 23 03 06
130 02 12 19 16 13 11 08 09 05 03 23 06 22 10 01 18
131 09
132 01 05 16 06 14 02 12
133 21 13 09 22 18 06 23 20 04
134 20 10 13 23 15 03 08 22 14 04 02 19 12 16 21
135 14 02 16 19 12 08 09 11 22 18 03 10 23 01
136 05 13 18 21 22 08 09 15 01 24 17 20
137 16 13 14 18 05 09 08 06 23 10 17 15
138 19 16 21 05 08 13 15 11 09 22 18 06 01 20 04 07
139 13 21 08 16 05 19 14 12 02 09 01 20 23 17 04
140 23 18 01 09 22
141 11 15
142 02 14 21 15 12 09 13 22 18 03 23 06 20
143 21 08 05 15 13 11 09 22 18 06 03 01 23 10 20 02 16
144 19 09 16 11 14 18 22 03 23 06
145 19 15 16 11 14 09 03 22 18 23
146 19 14 05 02 15 16 21 11 09 18 22 03 23 06
147 07 02 08 03 20 22 13 23 10 12 19 18
148 13 16 14 05 08 02 12
149
150 09 15 08 19 14 16 03 20
" 78“
APPENDIX B
Eleven Statements 
Selected as Representative of American Public Opinion
Columns 1,2,3: Subject identification
Columns 5 Statements selected to assess attitudes
of the general public
—79—
S Eleven Statements
001 17 07 20 04 10 23 22 09 14 12 02
002 17 04 07 24 10 01 23 15 19 12 02
003 20 04 10 03 15 22 05 21 12 16 19
004 20 24 01 10 22 13 14 15 11 12 19
005 07 20 17 22 03 09 23 18 15 13 02
006 07 06 24 22 15 11 16 14 05 19 21
007 07 20 04 23 01 06 15 11 08 12 19
008 17 03 06 10 23 22 13 12 05 19 02
009 17 24 10 03 09 22 18 23 12 05 02
010 01 10 17 06 18 16 23 15 14 21 05
011 17 10 03 23 22 01 15 06 09 02 12
012 17 04 20 24 23 10 03 01 06 18 21
013 04 24 17 07 05 20 14 08 12 15 11
014 07 24 10 06 03 22 14 05 15 02 12
015 17 20 04 06 23 08 19 11 15 13 21
016 04 24 20 10 03 18 06 05 15 16 02
017 24 17 23 10 06 22 09 15 21 13 02
018 01 03 06 09 10 18 22 23 02 15 14
019 20 04 01 23 17 16 14 21 15 13 08
020 24 20 01 09 18 03 14 16 21 15 08
021 04 17 10 01 03 22 15 14 21 19 12
022 24 20 17 22 15 11 19 21 14 12 02
023 17 04 01 06 09 15 02 12 08 13 22
024 20 24 01 06 18 23 15 22 21 05 12
025 07 17 10 23 18 03 22 09 15 08 12
" 80“
S Eleven Statements
026 07 04 06 23 22 15 16 21 14 19 12
027 20 17 10 01 18 22 23 15 16 14 19
028 07 17 04 03 10 24 21 12 22 23 18
029 04 17 20 10 03 22 01 09 18 21 12
030 03 10 01 20 08 14 06 18 11 09 15
031 17 10 23 18 06 12 14 21 08 05 16
032 17 20 23 10 01 06 09 08 15 21 12
033 24 17 10 23 09 22 13 14 05 21 19
034 17 07 20 15 11 22 09 21 12 05 02
035 07 17 04 20 10 18 13 19 16 12 02
036 20 10 23 04 03 01 22 06 18 09 21
037 20 10 06 23 03 18 09 08 15 21 14
038 07 04 20 10 03 23 13 05 08 12 15
039 17 20 06 01 18 10 03 09 15 08 16
040 17 10 03 01 20 22 09 15 19 16 02
041 17 10 03 06 22 15 16 14 21 12 02
042 17 20 15 03 23 22 09 21 14 12 02
043 20 22 03 18 09 15 05 08 21 02 12
044 04 07 20 24 06 22 11 08 13 05 14
045 04 24 20 10 01 22 15 11 21 16 19
046 17 20 10 01 18 16 13 03 23 02 21
047 04 24 10 23 01 11 15 08 14 21 02
048 19 16 02 21 15 11 10 01 17 20 07
049 07 17 10 23 01 03 18 09 12 21 19
050 24 10 01 23 22 09 18 08 05 12 02
“8 1 —
S Eleven Statementa
051 12 02 13 22 18 06 23 17 10 04 24
052 17 24 10 01 03 22 09 08 23 12 02
053 07 20 23 10 22 11 15 21 08 05 12
054 17 20 10 01 03 22 06 16 12 21 19
055 23 10 01 03 22 09 18 15 08 13 14
056 07 17 20 10 01 03 18 19 13 12 02
057 17 07 04 06 01 10 15 22 14 02 12
058 07 20 10 23 03 22 18 09 15 13 19
059 06 17 03 07 01 10 19 13 02 08 15
060 02 05 12 13 21 22 06 18 01 04 17
061 10 23 03 09 01 06 18 22 13 05 02
062 17 10 23 03 22 18 06 01 09 15 08
063 01 18 10 23 09 15 13 14 16 21 05
064 01 04 05 24 17 06 21 16 13 19 02
065 17 04 24 10 11 22 15 05 14 02 12
066 20 23 01 18 10 03 15 12 21 14 08
067 01 10 04 17 20 22 21 14 02 12 19
068 17 04 10 11 03 22 01 09 18 14 12
069 17 20 01 06 22 11 15 14 21 19 02
070 17 20 03 18 22 10 23 08 14 21 12
071 17 01 10 23 03 22 09 15 08 14 12
072 20 17 24 10 06 23 08 13 15 21 02
073 20 23 03 01 10 16 15 21 19 06 18
074 20 24 18 01 22 03 09 10 13 15 16
075 07 04 10 23 01 22 16 08 13 19 02
—82—
S Eleven Statements
076 20 17 24 10 23 22 18 01 08 13 12
077 17 07 20 04 11 02 05 12 16 19 21
078 20 24 03 23 10 22 08 15 18 12 02
079 07 04 17 23 10 15 22 18 09 12 02
080 17 01 10 18 03 09 23 21 13 12 02
081 17 20 10 01 22 18 03 15 21 14 12
082 20 10 01 06 22 11 12 15 16 21 19
083 20 04 07 01 22 06 15 13 12 19 02
084 07 04 10 03 06 22 18 15 05 12 19
085 20 24 17 10 18 22 15 21 14 08 02
086 04 20 10 17 22 06 08 15 21 12 16
087 07 20 10 06 23 22 09 18 15 14 12
088 04 02 16 18 15 22 03 18 08 14 21
089 20 24 10 23 06 09 22 03 15 14 12
090 04 10 01 06 13 16 05 21 14 08 02
091 17 24 10 23 22 01 06 18 15 12 02
092 17 04 20 10 22 11 05 21 12 19 02
093 17 04 01 08 22 15 11 21 16 12 05
094 20 04 10 01 06 03 09 15 05 12 02
095 23 10 06 09 08 15 13 14 16 12 02
096 17 10 23 18 22 13 21 08 14 16 02
097 04 20 24 06 01 09 13 15 08 21 12
098 17 24 20 23 10 06 01 03 18 09 22
099 17 23 10 03 01 06 09 18 22 15 21
100 01 06 22 18 09 03 15 13 05 08 21
“ 83”
S Eleven Statements
101 20 10 01 23 03 06 18 09 15 13 21
102 06 18 03 09 22 15 08 05 14 21 16
103 20 10 23 03 09 18 13 15 21 14 12
104 07 04 06 03 10 18 09 15 05 21 12
105 17 20 10 01 23 18 06 22 03 09 15
106 17 10 23 06 03 15 13 05 08 21 14
107 20 10 01 03 18 09 05 13 15 08 21
108 18 09 13 08 15 21 05 14 19 12 02
109 17 10 23 01 18 06 22 03 09 15 08
110 17 20 24 23 10 01 07 18 09 13 08
111 04 20 10 03 22 09 18 06 01 14 02
112 23 06 01 03 18 08 15 05 21 16 12
113 24 10 23 01 06 18 03 09 22 13 08
114 20 10 23 03 18 09 15 08 05 13 19
115 07 20 04 03 18 09 15 13 21 05 16
116 04 17 24 20 23 06 01 10 03 18 09
117 23 03 06 09 22 15 13 05 21 14 16
118 23 01 06 03 18 22 09 15 13 08 21
119 17 23 01 06 03 09 15 21 14 16 12
120 20 24 10 23 01 03 18 22 15 13 08
121 20 10 01 23 03 18 09 14 15 16 21
122 24 23 10 06 01 09 18 03 22 11 15
123 04 10 01 23 03 15 13 05 08 21 14
124 17 20 23 24 10 03 01 06 09 22 18
125 20 23 10 18 06 22 03 09 08 05 14
—84—
S Eleven Statements
126 04 20 01 03 06 22 09 15 13 05 12
127 04 20 10 06 01 03 23 18 22 09 15
128 20 10 01 03 09 18 15 08 21 14 12
129 24 10 23 03 01 06 22 18 09 15 08
130 20 23 10 03 06 18 22 09 15 21 05
131 10 23 01 06 18 09 03 15 13 05 08
132 23 10 03 06 18 22 09 13 15 08 05
133 04 20 10 23 01 06 03 18 22 09 15
134 10 23 06 01 03 18 09 13 15 08 14
135 20 10 23 06 03 18 09 15 13 11 08
136 10 23 06 01 03 18 08 05 14 16 19
137 24 06 01 03 18 09 15 13 05 21 14
138 24 17 20 10 23 03 11 15 14 02 12
139 04 20 10 01 06 03 18 08 21 14 12
140 20 24 17 03 23 22 11 15 12 02 19
141 07 04 17 20 23 22 05 08 21 12 02
142 01 10 24 06 23 03 20 18 09 15 21
143 17 10 20 23 06 03 15 08 21 16 02
144 04 10 23 03 18 22 09 15 08 21 14
145 17 10 23 06 18 09 13 21 14 16 12
146 23 10 01 06 03 18 09 13 08 15 05
147 04 07 06 12 08 05 15 11 14 16 21
148 17 01 23 03 18 09 15 19 05 21 02
149 17 10 03 22 09 18 15 14 21 02 12
150 10 23 06 03 18 15 13 01 05 21 14
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